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Apr 30, 2024 (newstodate): For safety reasons, Finnair has suspended flights on its route connecting Helsinki and Tartu Airport, in Estonia, from April 29 to May 31, 2024.
Last week, GPS jamming caused two Finnair flights to return to Helsinki due to GPS disturbances over Estonia.
EANS, the Estonian Air Navigation Services, and Finnair are now investigating alternative solutions to the use of GPS during May to allow safe flight operations to return.
In March, the Estonian Air Navigation Services implemented an alternative navigation solution DME-DME, the starting point of which was to support air traffic at three kilometers and above.
Taking the new situation in account, EANS is now looking for additional ways to support airlines at lower altitudes during the landing process.
In addition to GPS, Tartu Airport has a precision landing system ILS for landing in one direction, which is based on the information coming from the equipment on the ground at the airport, the heading beacon and the glideslope beacon.
However, at the moment there is a concern about how to support aircraft flying below three kilometers.
Airlines in the Nordic and Baltic regions are taking the issue of Russian GPS spoofing seriously.
-During the past year, both the aviation industry and the transport industry as a whole have periodically encountered intentional GPS interference – GPS satellite signal distortion or jamming, signal shift, and misleading signal transmission, says an airBaltic spokesperson.
-airBaltic can confirm that its routes to select destinations have been also affected by this phenomenon.
In February 2024, intelligence reports show that Russia has deployed a fixed jamming system to its military exclave at Kaliningrad, enclosed by Lithuania.
According to The Telegraph, the system named Tobol is thus now active in the Baltic and Nordic region, interfering with the GPS guidance of aviation and maritime traffic.
Speaking to The Telegraph, Estonia’s military chief said that a surge in disruptions had been detected in an area stretching all the way from Finland, through the Baltic states and Poland.
The problem is now considered a high-priority issue for civil aviation, causing EASA to partner with IATA to counter aviation safety threats from spoofing and jamming.
Mitigating these risks requires short-, medium- and long-term measures, beginning with the sharing of incident information and remedies.
Measures include reporting and sharing of GNSS interference event data; guidance from aircraft manufacturers; alerting; and back-up to retain a minimum operational network of traditional navigation aids to ensure that there is a conventional back-up for GNSS navigation.